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Article 5

Editorial: Ever Say Die?
Ned H. Cassem, S.J., M.D.
Three myths seriously obstruct
the care of the critically ill.
Caught between the crossfire of
euthanasia societies and pro-life
groups, ph y sic ian s are often
blamed for not accepting oversimplified solutions to complex or
insoluble problems. Three of the
commonest simplistic shibboleths
earmarked for situations of critical illness are the following. (1)
Medical care of the sick has been
dehumanized by advanced technology. Although a convenient
misplacement of responsibility,
this myth is patently false. Technology never dehumanized anybody. Human beings dehumanize
other human beings. The means
chosen are irrelevant, even though
it is easier to blame the means
rather than those who employ [or
request] them. (2) "Natural"
death occurs with "dignity." As
reassuring as this maxim might
be, it masks the separation, loss,
debilitation, auguish, helplessness, organ failure, and pain that
are as naturally associated with
dying as energy, vitality, and a
sense of well being are associated
with healthy living. (3) God gave
life; H e will determine when it is
to be taken away . God, it seems,
was intelligent enough to leave
this responsibility to lesser beings.
This unthinking maxim apparently assumes that all technology
available to prolong life must be
used simply because it exists. If
one acts according to this principle, technology uses him, not he
technology. Although decisions
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made according to this reasoning
are irresponsible and only intensify the problems of the sick,
t.hey follow a deceptively simple
process. The welfare of the patient is not considered and he
himself, like the physician, is presumed to have no choice in the
matter.
Slogans ring hollow in intensive
care units, where life and death
decisions are no longer theoretical issues. In this issue that decision making process is not only
explored historically, legally and
ethically, but two authors report
on their efforts to expose, guide
and observe it as it happens on
the spot - in the ICU itself. Dr.
Tagge describes a treatment classification system he and others
devised for the ICU at New
York's Mt. Sinai Hospital. The
classification presents four "degrees" of treatment: I. maximum
therapy without reservation; II.
same as I, but situation to be reevaluated; III. comfort measures
only; IV. life sustaining measures
can be stopped. This system
forces the treatment team to
formulate clearly and to specify
openly what t.he treatment aim is
at any given time and why. Communication between physicians,
consultants, h 0 use staff and
nurses was essential and could not
be avoided. This was the major
purpose of the system. Decisions
were no easier but reasons for
adding, subtracting or withholding treatment had to be made explicit, so that any member of the
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team could weigh them against
the best interest of the patient.
Dr. Shoemaker then reports the
actual use of the classification
system in 1000 consecutive admissions to the ICU~ In so doing
he provides evidence that such a
system can be successfully and
flexibly used - two patients in
category IV, for example, recovered. The system protects this
possibility. Shoemaker, however,
pinpoints the most difficult question: what does "hopeless" or "irreversible" mean? More precisely,
(1) what is the probability that a
given course of treatment will restore the patient's health, and (2)
what will the restored state consist of and will it justify the efforts? Answers. to these two questions, if attainable at all, are the
most basic and important " medical" facts in every decision. Unfortunatel y, this information may
not become precise until treatment is well under way.
Fr. McCormick points out that
life is not an absolute good nor
death an absolute evil. Mere preservation of life for its own sake is
therefore not an end compatible
with J udaeo-Christian e t hie s .
What means should be taken to
preserve it, then? That is, how do
we define "extraordinary" means
- those which we have no obligation to take in an irreversible
illness? B ee a use quality-of-life
judgments are involved , a danger
lies in using only personal factors
to determine ethical norms. Aqdressing himself to the related
issue of ahortion ethics, McCormick argues that John Fletcher's
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recent attempt to differentiate
fetus from newborn fails because
it bases the differences on factors
that are not normative - i.e. ,
constitutive of the essential personhood of the individual. He
warns that decisions to treat or
not, which must take into account personal perceptions, attitudes and desires, cannot stop
there. As such , they are insufficient grounds for making normative ethical judgments.
With a lawyer's sense of the
rights of his client, George Annas
confronts us with how often the
patient is left out of the decisionmaking about his treatment, and
that his is the right to say what
should or should not be done to
him. To protect the rights of any
ICU patient entering a treatment
classification system, Annas demands demonstration of four
things: proper authority (approval of executive board of the
hospital, and directors of the
I CU), proper -documen ta tion (recording of treatment classification
in patient's permanent chart),
adequate pre d i c t ion criteria
(unanimity of me d i c a I views
about salvageability), and adequate patient representation (patient himself and / or a "patient
rights advocate" in the ICU) .
Annas reminds us that reversal
of nature's downhill course toward death is precisely what intensive care units were established to provide. If there is even
a small chance of restored health
(how small no one has determined, but he sets the limit at
two per cent), responsibility and
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honor require an all-out effort on
the part of ICU personnel. If any
decision-making system deprives
the patient of what voice he now
has in the process, it should be
opposed.
We end where we began - wi th
more questions than answers.
Nevertheless, our decisions in individual cases will be improved if
we can keep three questions and
five checkpoints in mind. (1)
What are the chances of this person's restoration to health? (2)
Will the patient be sufficiently
restored to health to justify the
effort, or will the "grave inconvenience" (Pius VII's word)
make the means "extraordinary"?
Answers to these first two questions should cover five checkpoints: (a) technological (what
can be done and what treatments
are available to reverse the downhill course of the illness? how effective will the treatment be?) ;
(b) socioeconomic (how limited
are the resources of the family,
the community, and society?);
(c) moral/e thical (how is this individual decision justified by criteria and norms that are constitutive of human personhood in general?); (d) legal (what does the
patient say? are his rights infringed upon?); (e) psychological
(what irrelevant motives bias the
decision - e.g., patient's being
disliked, poor, arriving for treatment at 3 a.m., etc?) .
Answering the first two questions accounts for almost all the
energy expended in arguments
about treating the hopelessly ill.
One of the strongest incentives to
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prolong these disputes is the nearly complete avoidance of the third
and final question. (3) Whether
the decision is to save or let die,
how does one conduct oneself iIi
the face of imminent death? Almost every a d m iss ion to an
ICU requires this encounter for
patient and staff. Admission is
justified, in fact, by the danger to
life present with the patient efsewhere. In treating the critically
ill patient, some talk as though
making the decision to escala:te
or limit treatment solves the
problem. It is rather then when
the task becomes most difficult.
How are we to take care of the
individual for whom further efforts to save are inappropriate?
He may remain fully conscious, or
if he is not, his family are. While
some treatment efforts are modified or withheld, others must now
be intensified. Preparation and
support of the family throughout
illness are as much a part of' our
responsibility to them as providing semi-miraculous technologies.
Whenever a person lies mortally
ill, hopefully he, his physician,
family and staff can share the
burden and confront together the
realities that often dwarf them
all. Although there are some
heroic measures that need not be
used for irreversibly ill patients,
some always remain necessary:
namely, extraordinary sensitivity,
extreme responsibility, her oi c
compassion. For care itself must
continue to the end of life and
never cease to be total, even when
major facets of it are duly limited'
or stopped.
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